diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 2a9a894..5ca04fd 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.122.47
+0.122.49
diff --git a/core/migrations/031_refresh_token_custom_claims.sql b/core/migrations/031_refresh_token_custom_claims.sql
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfdc873
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/migrations/031_refresh_token_custom_claims.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-- =============================================================================
+-- 031_refresh_token_custom_claims.sql
+--
+-- Carry the additive JWT custom claims (e.g. the namespace's account_id from
+-- the auth-claims-provider hook, bugboard #548/#920) ALONGSIDE the refresh
+-- token, so a rotated access token keeps the same claims without re-invoking
+-- the namespace's claims-provider function on every 15-min refresh (the
+-- refresh path is the latency-critical VoIP-wake path, bugboard #125).
+--
+-- Resolved once at /v1/auth/verify mint time, stored here, and replayed +
+-- propagated across each rotation. NULL/absent = no custom claims (the default
+-- for every namespace without a claims-provider) → fully backward compatible.
+-- =============================================================================
+
+ALTER TABLE refresh_tokens ADD COLUMN custom_claims TEXT;
diff --git a/core/pkg/contracts/auth.go b/core/pkg/contracts/auth.go
index 25630a0..152d235 100644
--- a/core/pkg/contracts/auth.go
+++ b/core/pkg/contracts/auth.go
@@ -43,9 +43,10 @@ type AuthService interface {
 	// Verifies signature, expiration, and issuer.
 	ParseAndVerifyJWT(token string) (*JWTClaims, error)
 
-	// GenerateJWT creates a new signed JWT with the specified claims and TTL.
+	// GenerateJWT creates a new signed JWT with the specified subject, TTL, and
+	// optional additive custom claims (nil = none; bugboard #548).
 	// Returns: token, expirationUnix, error.
-	GenerateJWT(namespace, subject string, ttl time.Duration) (string, int64, error)
+	GenerateJWT(namespace, subject string, ttl time.Duration, custom map[string]string) (string, int64, error)
 
 	// RegisterApp registers a new client application with the gateway.
 	// Returns an application ID that can be used for OAuth flows.
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/crypto.go b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/crypto.go
index 9f987fa..375d045 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/crypto.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/crypto.go
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto/hmac"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
 )
 
 // sha256Hex returns the lowercase hex-encoded SHA-256 hash of the input string.
@@ -22,3 +23,34 @@ func HmacSHA256Hex(data, secret string) string {
 	mac.Write([]byte(data))
 	return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
 }
+
+// marshalClaims serializes additive JWT custom claims for storage alongside a
+// refresh token (bugboard #548). Empty/nil → "" so the column stays NULL-ish
+// and absent claims read back as nil.
+func marshalClaims(m map[string]string) string {
+	if len(m) == 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	b, err := json.Marshal(m)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return string(b)
+}
+
+// unmarshalClaims is the inverse of marshalClaims. An empty string or any
+// malformed value yields nil (fail-soft — a corrupt claims blob must never
+// break token rotation; the token simply rotates without custom claims).
+func unmarshalClaims(s string) map[string]string {
+	if s == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var m map[string]string
+	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(s), &m); err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if len(m) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return m
+}
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/jwt.go b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/jwt.go
index 4e79fd1..9494cad 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/jwt.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/jwt.go
@@ -182,15 +182,22 @@ func (s *Service) ParseAndVerifyJWT(token string) (*JWTClaims, error) {
 	return &claims, nil
 }
 
-func (s *Service) GenerateJWT(ns, subject string, ttl time.Duration) (string, int64, error) {
+// GenerateJWT mints a signed access token. `custom` carries additive
+// app-defined claims (e.g. the namespace's account_id from the claims-provider
+// hook, bugboard #548) under the top-level "custom" object — read back via
+// JWTClaims.Custom / oh.GetCallerClaim. Pass nil for none. Reserved claims
+// (sub/iss/aud/iat/nbf/exp/namespace) are always gateway-controlled and cannot
+// be overridden by `custom` (the caller is responsible for not putting
+// reserved keys here; the claims-provider path sanitizes them out upstream).
+func (s *Service) GenerateJWT(ns, subject string, ttl time.Duration, custom map[string]string) (string, int64, error) {
 	// Prefer EdDSA when available
 	if s.preferEdDSA && s.edSigningKey != nil {
-		return s.generateEdDSAJWT(ns, subject, ttl)
+		return s.generateEdDSAJWT(ns, subject, ttl, custom)
 	}
-	return s.generateRSAJWT(ns, subject, ttl)
+	return s.generateRSAJWT(ns, subject, ttl, custom)
 }
 
-func (s *Service) generateEdDSAJWT(ns, subject string, ttl time.Duration) (string, int64, error) {
+func (s *Service) generateEdDSAJWT(ns, subject string, ttl time.Duration, custom map[string]string) (string, int64, error) {
 	if s.edSigningKey == nil {
 		return "", 0, errors.New("EdDSA signing key unavailable")
 	}
@@ -211,6 +218,9 @@ func (s *Service) generateEdDSAJWT(ns, subject string, ttl time.Duration) (strin
 		"exp":       exp.Unix(),
 		"namespace": ns,
 	}
+	if len(custom) > 0 {
+		payload["custom"] = custom
+	}
 	pb, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
 	hb64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hb)
 	pb64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pb)
@@ -220,7 +230,7 @@ func (s *Service) generateEdDSAJWT(ns, subject string, ttl time.Duration) (strin
 	return signingInput + "." + sb64, exp.Unix(), nil
 }
 
-func (s *Service) generateRSAJWT(ns, subject string, ttl time.Duration) (string, int64, error) {
+func (s *Service) generateRSAJWT(ns, subject string, ttl time.Duration, custom map[string]string) (string, int64, error) {
 	if s.signingKey == nil {
 		return "", 0, errors.New("signing key unavailable")
 	}
@@ -241,6 +251,9 @@ func (s *Service) generateRSAJWT(ns, subject string, ttl time.Duration) (string,
 		"exp":       exp.Unix(),
 		"namespace": ns,
 	}
+	if len(custom) > 0 {
+		payload["custom"] = custom
+	}
 	pb, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
 	hb64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hb)
 	pb64 := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pb)
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/refresh_rotation_test.go b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/refresh_rotation_test.go
index 158cb02..cd2beb8 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/refresh_rotation_test.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/refresh_rotation_test.go
@@ -31,8 +31,15 @@ type rotationMockORMDB struct {
 	client.DatabaseClient
 	mu             sync.Mutex
 	subjectByToken map[string]string // hashedToken -> subject (nil/missing = "invalid")
+	claimsByToken  map[string]string // hashedToken -> custom_claims JSON (bugboard #548)
 	inserted       int               // count of INSERTs (new refresh-token rows)
 	subjects       map[string]string // subject -> last hashed token inserted
+	// selectErrRemaining: number of upcoming "SELECT subject" calls that
+	// should return selectErr (simulates a transient rqlite leader outage).
+	// Decremented per matching call; 0 = serve normally (bugboard #125).
+	selectErr           error
+	selectErrRemaining  int
+	selectAttemptsTaken int
 }
 
 func (m *rotationMockORMDB) Query(_ context.Context, sql string, args ...interface{}) (*client.QueryResult, error) {
@@ -45,14 +52,23 @@ func (m *rotationMockORMDB) Query(_ context.Context, sql string, args ...interfa
 	if containsCI(sql, "SELECT id FROM namespaces") {
 		return &client.QueryResult{Count: 1, Rows: [][]interface{}{{int64(1)}}}, nil
 	}
-	// SELECT subject for the refresh-token lookup.
-	if containsCI(sql, "SELECT subject FROM refresh_tokens") {
+	// SELECT subject (+ custom_claims, bugboard #548) for the lookup.
+	if containsCI(sql, "SELECT subject") && containsCI(sql, "FROM refresh_tokens") {
+		m.selectAttemptsTaken++
+		if m.selectErrRemaining > 0 {
+			m.selectErrRemaining--
+			return nil, m.selectErr
+		}
 		if len(args) < 2 {
 			return &client.QueryResult{Count: 0}, nil
 		}
 		hashedTok, _ := args[1].(string)
 		if subj, ok := m.subjectByToken[hashedTok]; ok && subj != "" {
-			return &client.QueryResult{Count: 1, Rows: [][]interface{}{{subj}}}, nil
+			claims := ""
+			if m.claimsByToken != nil {
+				claims = m.claimsByToken[hashedTok]
+			}
+			return &client.QueryResult{Count: 1, Rows: [][]interface{}{{subj, claims}}}, nil
 		}
 		return &client.QueryResult{Count: 0}, nil
 	}
@@ -71,6 +87,14 @@ func (m *rotationMockORMDB) Query(_ context.Context, sql string, args ...interfa
 				m.subjectByToken = map[string]string{}
 			}
 			m.subjectByToken[hashedTok] = subj
+			// custom_claims is the LAST arg (bugboard #548) — capture it so
+			// rotation-propagation tests can assert it carries forward.
+			if m.claimsByToken == nil {
+				m.claimsByToken = map[string]string{}
+			}
+			if cc, ok := args[len(args)-1].(string); ok {
+				m.claimsByToken[hashedTok] = cc
+			}
 		}
 		return &client.QueryResult{Count: 1}, nil
 	}
@@ -369,3 +393,120 @@ func TestRefreshToken_RotatedTokenReplayFails(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("expected error reusing rotated token, got nil")
 	}
 }
+
+// Bugboard #125: a TRANSIENT rqlite error on the lookup (leader briefly
+// unavailable during a rolling restart) must surface as ErrRefreshTransient
+// (→ 503, retryable) — NOT "invalid or expired" (→ 401, full SIWE re-auth,
+// impossible on a locked device answering a VoIP-woken call).
+func TestRefreshToken_transientSelectError_returnsTransient(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ormDB, _ := newRotationTestService(t)
+	const refresh = "valid-but-leader-down"
+	ormDB.subjectByToken[sha256Hex(refresh)] = "0xWALLET"
+	// Every lookup attempt across the whole retry window errors.
+	ormDB.selectErr = errors.New("rqlite: leadership lost")
+	ormDB.selectErrRemaining = 99
+
+	_, _, _, _, err := s.RefreshToken(context.Background(), refresh, "anchat-test")
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrRefreshTransient) {
+		t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrRefreshTransient (a valid token must not 401 during a leader outage)", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The lookup is retried, so a brief blip recovers transparently within one
+// refresh call (no client-visible failure at all).
+func TestRefreshToken_selectRecoversAfterRetry(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ormDB, _ := newRotationTestService(t)
+	const refresh = "valid-blips-then-ok"
+	ormDB.subjectByToken[sha256Hex(refresh)] = "0xWALLET"
+	ormDB.selectErr = errors.New("rqlite: leadership lost")
+	ormDB.selectErrRemaining = refreshSelectRetries - 1 // fail all but the last attempt
+
+	access, newRefresh, subj, _, err := s.RefreshToken(context.Background(), refresh, "anchat-test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("RefreshToken should recover after transient blips: %v", err)
+	}
+	if access == "" || newRefresh == "" || subj != "0xWALLET" {
+		t.Errorf("recovered refresh incomplete: access=%q newRefresh=%q subj=%q", access, newRefresh, subj)
+	}
+}
+
+// A transient error on the CAS write (revoke) is also retryable, not a 401.
+func TestRefreshToken_transientUpdateError_returnsTransient(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ormDB, rq := newRotationTestService(t)
+	const refresh = "valid-cas-write-down"
+	ormDB.subjectByToken[sha256Hex(refresh)] = "0xWALLET"
+	rq.execErrNext = []error{errors.New("rqlite: write failed, no leader")}
+
+	_, _, _, _, err := s.RefreshToken(context.Background(), refresh, "anchat-test")
+	if !errors.Is(err, ErrRefreshTransient) {
+		t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrRefreshTransient on a transient CAS write error", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// A genuinely unknown token must remain a hard invalid (401), NOT be masked as
+// transient — the distinction is the whole point of the #125 fix.
+func TestRefreshToken_unknownToken_isNotTransient(t *testing.T) {
+	s, _, _ := newRotationTestService(t)
+	_, _, _, _, err := s.RefreshToken(context.Background(), "never-existed", "anchat-test")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for unknown token")
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, ErrRefreshTransient) {
+		t.Errorf("unknown token must be a genuine invalid (401), not transient (503): %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// mockClaimsResolver is a fixed claims-provider stand-in for the mint tests.
+type mockClaimsResolver struct{ claims map[string]string }
+
+func (m mockClaimsResolver) ResolveClaims(_ context.Context, _, _ string) map[string]string {
+	return m.claims
+}
+
+// Bugboard #548: claims resolved at IssueTokens (login) must be stored with the
+// refresh token AND replayed into the rotated access token — so account_id
+// survives the 15-min refresh without re-invoking the provider.
+func TestRefreshToken_propagatesCustomClaims(t *testing.T) {
+	s, ormDB, _ := newRotationTestService(t)
+	s.SetClaimsResolver(mockClaimsResolver{claims: map[string]string{"account_id": "u-999"}})
+
+	// Login mint — IssueTokens resolves + stores the claims with the refresh row.
+	_, refresh, _, err := s.IssueTokens(context.Background(), "0xWALLET", "anchat-test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("IssueTokens: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := ormDB.claimsByToken[sha256Hex(refresh)]; got != `{"account_id":"u-999"}` {
+		t.Fatalf("claims not stored with refresh token; got %q", got)
+	}
+
+	// Refresh — the rotated access token must carry account_id, and the NEW
+	// refresh row must propagate the stored claims.
+	access, newRefresh, _, _, err := s.RefreshToken(context.Background(), refresh, "anchat-test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("RefreshToken: %v", err)
+	}
+	claims, err := s.ParseAndVerifyJWT(access)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ValidateJWT: %v", err)
+	}
+	if claims.Custom["account_id"] != "u-999" {
+		t.Errorf("rotated access token lost account_id; custom=%v", claims.Custom)
+	}
+	if got := ormDB.claimsByToken[sha256Hex(newRefresh)]; got != `{"account_id":"u-999"}` {
+		t.Errorf("rotation did not propagate claims to the new row; got %q", got)
+	}
+
+	// Second rotation hop (N+1 → N+2): the claim must survive repeated
+	// rotations, not just the first — the propagation is the whole point.
+	access2, _, _, _, err := s.RefreshToken(context.Background(), newRefresh, "anchat-test")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second RefreshToken: %v", err)
+	}
+	claims2, err := s.ParseAndVerifyJWT(access2)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ParseAndVerifyJWT (2nd): %v", err)
+	}
+	if claims2.Custom["account_id"] != "u-999" {
+		t.Errorf("account_id lost across the second rotation; custom=%v", claims2.Custom)
+	}
+}
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/service.go b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/service.go
index 407c35b..008b162 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/service.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/service.go
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ type Service struct {
 	edKeyID          string
 	preferEdDSA      bool
 	defaultNS        string
-	apiKeyHMACSecret string // HMAC secret for hashing API keys before storage
+	apiKeyHMACSecret string         // HMAC secret for hashing API keys before storage
+	claimsResolver   ClaimsResolver // namespace claims-provider hook (bugboard #548); nil = none
 }
 
 func NewService(logger *logging.ColoredLogger, orm client.NetworkClient, signingKeyPEM string, defaultNS string) (*Service, error) {
@@ -84,6 +85,28 @@ func (s *Service) SetRqliteClient(db rqlite.Client) {
 	s.db = db
 }
 
+// ClaimsResolver resolves additive, namespace-defined JWT custom claims for an
+// authenticated wallet at token-mint time (bugboard #548/#920). The concrete
+// implementation invokes the namespace's reserved `auth-claims-provider`
+// serverless function; it MUST be fail-open (return nil, never error) so a
+// missing/slow/broken provider never breaks authentication. Injected via
+// SetClaimsResolver; nil = no custom claims (every namespace's default).
+type ClaimsResolver interface {
+	ResolveClaims(ctx context.Context, wallet, namespace string) map[string]string
+}
+
+// SetClaimsResolver wires the namespace claims-provider hook used at mint time.
+func (s *Service) SetClaimsResolver(r ClaimsResolver) { s.claimsResolver = r }
+
+// resolveCustomClaims returns the namespace's additive claims for this wallet,
+// or nil. Fail-open by contract — the resolver never errors.
+func (s *Service) resolveCustomClaims(ctx context.Context, wallet, namespace string) map[string]string {
+	if s.claimsResolver == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return s.claimsResolver.ResolveClaims(ctx, wallet, namespace)
+}
+
 // ErrRotationNotConfigured is returned by RefreshToken when the service
 // wasn't given an rqlite client — refusing to rotate without atomicity
 // guarantees is safer than rotating non-atomically.
@@ -224,8 +247,13 @@ func (s *Service) IssueTokens(ctx context.Context, wallet, namespace string) (st
 		return "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("signing key unavailable")
 	}
 
+	// Resolve namespace-defined additive claims (bugboard #548) ONCE at mint
+	// time. Stored with the refresh token below and replayed across rotations
+	// so the 15-min refresh path never re-invokes the provider.
+	custom := s.resolveCustomClaims(ctx, wallet, namespace)
+
 	// Issue access token (15m)
-	token, expUnix, err := s.GenerateJWT(namespace, wallet, 15*time.Minute)
+	token, expUnix, err := s.GenerateJWT(namespace, wallet, 15*time.Minute, custom)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JWT: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -246,8 +274,8 @@ func (s *Service) IssueTokens(ctx context.Context, wallet, namespace string) (st
 	db := s.orm.Database()
 	hashedRefresh := sha256Hex(refresh)
 	if _, err := db.Query(internalCtx,
-		"INSERT INTO refresh_tokens(namespace_id, subject, token, audience, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, datetime('now', '+30 days'))",
-		nsID, wallet, hashedRefresh, "gateway",
+		"INSERT INTO refresh_tokens(namespace_id, subject, token, audience, expires_at, custom_claims) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, datetime('now', '+30 days'), ?)",
+		nsID, wallet, hashedRefresh, "gateway", marshalClaims(custom),
 	); err != nil {
 		return "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to store refresh token: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -265,6 +293,27 @@ func (s *Service) IssueTokens(ctx context.Context, wallet, namespace string) (st
 // This is the tripwire promised by RFC 9700 §4.12 (refresh-token rotation).
 var ErrRefreshTokenReplay = fmt.Errorf("refresh token already rotated or invalid")
 
+// ErrRefreshTransient is returned when refresh-token rotation fails for a
+// RETRYABLE reason — an rqlite-layer error rather than a genuine bad/expired
+// token. Bugboard #125: during a rolling gateway restart the rqlite leader is
+// briefly unavailable (re-election window), so the lookup/rotation errors;
+// collapsing that into "invalid token" forces a 401 → full SIWE re-auth, which
+// is impossible on a locked device answering a VoIP-woken call. Callers MUST
+// surface this as a retryable 503, NOT a 401, so the client retries within the
+// ring window instead of tearing down the session.
+var ErrRefreshTransient = fmt.Errorf("refresh token rotation temporarily unavailable")
+
+const (
+	// refreshSelectRetries bounds how many times the refresh lookup is retried
+	// when the rqlite read errors (transient leader unavailability). The read
+	// is idempotent and happens BEFORE any write, so retrying is safe.
+	refreshSelectRetries = 3
+	// refreshSelectRetryDelay is the backoff between lookup retries. Three
+	// tries × 250ms rides out a brief leader re-election without adding
+	// meaningful latency to the common (healthy-leader) path.
+	refreshSelectRetryDelay = 250 * time.Millisecond
+)
+
 // RefreshToken validates the supplied refresh token, atomically rotates it
 // (revokes the old, mints a new), and returns a fresh access token alongside
 // the rotated refresh token.
@@ -309,22 +358,61 @@ func (s *Service) RefreshToken(ctx context.Context, refreshToken, namespace stri
 
 	nsID, err := s.ResolveNamespaceID(ctx, namespace)
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", "", 0, err
+		// Bugboard #125: namespace resolution runs an rqlite query BEFORE the
+		// token lookup, so a leader re-election during a rolling restart fails
+		// here too. Treat it as retryable (→ 503), not a bad token (→ 401) —
+		// the refresh-path namespace comes from an already-authenticated
+		// session, so a resolution failure is a transient DB error, never the
+		// client's fault.
+		s.logger.ComponentWarn(logging.ComponentGeneral,
+			"refresh namespace resolution failed (transient, surfacing retryable)",
+			zap.String("namespace", namespace),
+			zap.Error(err))
+		return "", "", "", 0, ErrRefreshTransient
 	}
 
 	hashedRefresh := sha256Hex(refreshToken)
 
 	// Step 1: read the subject. Tells us who the token belongs to AND
 	// validates that it's currently usable (not revoked, not expired).
-	selectQ := `SELECT subject FROM refresh_tokens
+	//
+	// Bugboard #125: distinguish a TRANSIENT rqlite error (leader briefly
+	// unavailable during a rolling restart) from a GENUINE token miss. The
+	// read is idempotent and pre-write, so we retry it a few times; only after
+	// exhausting retries do we surface ErrRefreshTransient (→ 503, client
+	// retries). An actual empty result (Count == 0) is a real bad/expired
+	// token → "invalid or expired" (→ 401). Collapsing the two used to 401 a
+	// valid session during every restart, defeating the VoIP-wake refresh.
+	selectQ := `SELECT subject, custom_claims FROM refresh_tokens
 	            WHERE namespace_id = ? AND token = ?
 	              AND revoked_at IS NULL
 	              AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > datetime('now'))
 	            LIMIT 1`
-	res, err := ormDB.Query(internalCtx, selectQ, nsID, hashedRefresh)
-	if err != nil || res == nil || res.Count == 0 {
+	var res *client.QueryResult
+	var selErr error
+	for attempt := 0; attempt < refreshSelectRetries; attempt++ {
+		res, selErr = ormDB.Query(internalCtx, selectQ, nsID, hashedRefresh)
+		if selErr == nil && res != nil {
+			break
+		}
+		if attempt < refreshSelectRetries-1 {
+			time.Sleep(refreshSelectRetryDelay)
+		}
+	}
+	if selErr != nil || res == nil {
+		// rqlite error persisted across retries — leader likely mid-election.
+		// Retryable, NOT an invalid token.
+		s.logger.ComponentWarn(logging.ComponentGeneral,
+			"refresh token lookup failed (transient rqlite error, surfacing retryable)",
+			zap.String("namespace", namespace),
+			zap.Error(selErr))
+		return "", "", "", 0, ErrRefreshTransient
+	}
+	if res.Count == 0 {
+		// Genuinely not found / revoked / expired — a real bad token.
 		return "", "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid or expired refresh token")
 	}
+	var customClaimsJSON string
 	if len(res.Rows) > 0 && len(res.Rows[0]) > 0 {
 		if val, ok := res.Rows[0][0].(string); ok {
 			subject = val
@@ -332,7 +420,15 @@ func (s *Service) RefreshToken(ctx context.Context, refreshToken, namespace stri
 			b, _ := json.Marshal(res.Rows[0][0])
 			_ = json.Unmarshal(b, &subject)
 		}
+		// custom_claims (bugboard #548) — resolved once at login, replayed on
+		// every rotation so the refresh path never re-invokes the provider.
+		if len(res.Rows[0]) > 1 {
+			if cc, ok := res.Rows[0][1].(string); ok {
+				customClaimsJSON = cc
+			}
+		}
 	}
+	custom := unmarshalClaims(customClaimsJSON)
 
 	// Step 2: atomic CAS — revoke the old row. RowsAffected is the lock.
 	// Two concurrent calls with the same refresh token: exactly one wins
@@ -343,7 +439,13 @@ func (s *Service) RefreshToken(ctx context.Context, refreshToken, namespace stri
 		 WHERE namespace_id = ? AND token = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
 		nsID, hashedRefresh)
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("revoke old refresh token: %w", err)
+		// rqlite write error (leader unavailable) — retryable, not a bad
+		// token. No row was revoked, so a client retry is safe (bugboard #125).
+		s.logger.ComponentWarn(logging.ComponentGeneral,
+			"refresh token revoke failed (transient rqlite error, surfacing retryable)",
+			zap.String("namespace", namespace),
+			zap.Error(err))
+		return "", "", "", 0, ErrRefreshTransient
 	}
 	affected, _ := updRes.RowsAffected()
 	if affected == 0 {
@@ -359,8 +461,9 @@ func (s *Service) RefreshToken(ctx context.Context, refreshToken, namespace stri
 		return "", "", "", 0, ErrRefreshTokenReplay
 	}
 
-	// Step 3: mint the new access JWT.
-	accessToken, expUnix, err = s.GenerateJWT(namespace, subject, 15*time.Minute)
+	// Step 3: mint the new access JWT, carrying forward the stored custom
+	// claims so a rotated token keeps the same account_id etc. (bugboard #548).
+	accessToken, expUnix, err = s.GenerateJWT(namespace, subject, 15*time.Minute, custom)
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("generate access token: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -376,10 +479,23 @@ func (s *Service) RefreshToken(ctx context.Context, refreshToken, namespace stri
 	}
 	newRefreshToken = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(rbuf)
 	hashedNew := sha256Hex(newRefreshToken)
+	// Re-marshal from the parsed map (not the raw stored string) so the new
+	// row and the freshly-minted access token are provably consistent and
+	// self-healing — a malformed stored blob converges to "" on both sides
+	// rather than being propagated forward verbatim. custom_claims is written
+	// ONLY here and in IssueTokens, both from a sanitized map (bugboard #548).
 	if _, err := ormDB.Query(internalCtx,
-		"INSERT INTO refresh_tokens(namespace_id, subject, token, audience, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, datetime('now', '+30 days'))",
-		nsID, subject, hashedNew, "gateway"); err != nil {
-		return "", "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("store rotated refresh token: %w", err)
+		"INSERT INTO refresh_tokens(namespace_id, subject, token, audience, expires_at, custom_claims) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, datetime('now', '+30 days'), ?)",
+		nsID, subject, hashedNew, "gateway", marshalClaims(custom)); err != nil {
+		// The old token is already revoked (step 2). A retryable error here
+		// leaves the client to re-attempt — which will re-auth since the old
+		// token is gone — but that's strictly better than masking a transient
+		// failure as a permanent 401 (bugboard #125). Surface retryable.
+		s.logger.ComponentWarn(logging.ComponentGeneral,
+			"refresh token store failed after revoke (transient rqlite error)",
+			zap.String("namespace", namespace),
+			zap.Error(err))
+		return "", "", "", 0, ErrRefreshTransient
 	}
 
 	return accessToken, newRefreshToken, subject, expUnix, nil
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/service_test.go b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/service_test.go
index 434ca05..3993c5c 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/auth/service_test.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/auth/service_test.go
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func TestJWTFlow(t *testing.T) {
 	sub := "0x1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678"
 	ttl := 15 * time.Minute
 
-	token, exp, err := s.GenerateJWT(ns, sub, ttl)
+	token, exp, err := s.GenerateJWT(ns, sub, ttl, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateJWT failed: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ func TestEdDSAJWTFlow(t *testing.T) {
 	ttl := 15 * time.Minute
 
 	// With EdDSA preferred, GenerateJWT should produce an EdDSA token
-	token, exp, err := s.GenerateJWT(ns, sub, ttl)
+	token, exp, err := s.GenerateJWT(ns, sub, ttl, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateJWT (EdDSA) failed: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ func TestRS256BackwardCompat(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Generate an RS256 token directly (simulating a legacy token)
 	s.preferEdDSA = false
-	token, _, err := s.GenerateJWT("test-ns", "user1", 15*time.Minute)
+	token, _, err := s.GenerateJWT("test-ns", "user1", 15*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateJWT (RS256) failed: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ func TestEdDSACrossServiceVerify(t *testing.T) {
 
 	const wantSub = "BNbN2RNQTsYrrywZCLnhV9j3hd38jwcRqfxBecZX7hDE"
 	const wantNS = "anchat-test"
-	token, _, err := signer.GenerateJWT(wantNS, wantSub, 15*time.Minute)
+	token, _, err := signer.GenerateJWT(wantNS, wantSub, 15*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("signer.GenerateJWT: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ func TestEdDSACrossServiceVerify_differentKeysFail(t *testing.T) {
 	_, verKey, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
 	verifier.SetEdDSAKey(verKey)
 
-	token, _, err := signer.GenerateJWT("ns", "sub", 15*time.Minute)
+	token, _, err := signer.GenerateJWT("ns", "sub", 15*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateJWT: %v", err)
 	}
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/claims_provider.go b/core/pkg/gateway/claims_provider.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b218ec5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/claims_provider.go
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+package gateway
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"sort"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/DeBrosOfficial/network/pkg/serverless"
+	"github.com/DeBrosOfficial/network/pkg/serverless/registry"
+	"go.uber.org/zap"
+)
+
+// Claims-provider hook (bugboard #548/#920).
+//
+// A namespace opts into additive, signed JWT claims by deploying a serverless
+// function with the RESERVED name "auth-claims-provider". At /v1/auth/verify
+// mint time the gateway invokes it (in the namespace's own context, so it can
+// read the namespace's tables) with {"wallet","namespace"} and merges the
+// string→string object it returns into the JWT's custom claims — e.g.
+// {"account_id":"<users.user_id>"} so push devices key on the stable account
+// identity rather than the authenticating wallet.
+//
+// Hard guarantees:
+//   - FAIL-OPEN: a missing / slow / erroring / malformed provider yields NO
+//     claims; authentication never breaks because a claims function is down.
+//   - Reserved claims (sub/iss/aud/iat/nbf/exp/namespace/custom) can never be
+//     set by the provider — the gateway controls those.
+//   - Bounded: timeout, max claim count, max total size.
+
+const (
+	// claimsProviderFnName is the reserved function name a namespace deploys to
+	// inject additive JWT claims at mint time.
+	claimsProviderFnName = "auth-claims-provider"
+	// claimsProviderTimeout bounds the provider invocation so a slow/hung
+	// function never stalls the auth path past this budget (fail-open after).
+	claimsProviderTimeout = 2 * time.Second
+	// maxCustomClaims / maxCustomClaimsBytes cap what a provider may inject —
+	// JWTs ride in headers, and an unbounded claim blob is a DoS / cost vector.
+	maxCustomClaims      = 16
+	maxCustomClaimsBytes = 4096
+	// claimsProviderWarnInterval rate-limits the fail-open WARN so a broken
+	// provider doesn't flood the log on every login.
+	claimsProviderWarnInterval = 30 * time.Second
+)
+
+// reservedClaimKeys can never be injected by a namespace claims provider; the
+// gateway owns these. A provider that returns any of them has them dropped.
+var reservedClaimKeys = map[string]struct{}{
+	"sub": {}, "iss": {}, "aud": {}, "iat": {},
+	"nbf": {}, "exp": {}, "namespace": {}, "custom": {},
+}
+
+// jwtClaimsProvider implements auth.ClaimsResolver by invoking the namespace's
+// reserved auth-claims-provider function.
+type jwtClaimsProvider struct {
+	invoker *serverless.Invoker
+	logger  *zap.Logger
+
+	mu          sync.Mutex
+	lastWarnUTC time.Time
+}
+
+// newJWTClaimsProvider builds the resolver. A nil invoker disables the hook
+// (ResolveClaims returns nil).
+func newJWTClaimsProvider(invoker *serverless.Invoker, logger *zap.Logger) *jwtClaimsProvider {
+	if logger == nil {
+		logger = zap.NewNop()
+	}
+	return &jwtClaimsProvider{invoker: invoker, logger: logger.Named("claims-provider")}
+}
+
+// ResolveClaims invokes the namespace's auth-claims-provider and returns the
+// sanitized additive claims, or nil. Never errors (fail-open contract).
+func (p *jwtClaimsProvider) ResolveClaims(ctx context.Context, wallet, namespace string) map[string]string {
+	if p.invoker == nil || wallet == "" || namespace == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	input, err := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"wallet": wallet, "namespace": namespace})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	callCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, claimsProviderTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	resp, err := p.invoker.Invoke(callCtx, &serverless.InvokeRequest{
+		Namespace:    namespace,
+		FunctionName: claimsProviderFnName,
+		Input:        input,
+		// Gateway-initiated, no end-user caller → system trigger skips the
+		// per-caller authorization check.
+		TriggerType: serverless.TriggerTypeInternal,
+	})
+	if err != nil || resp == nil {
+		// The namespace simply hasn't deployed the function (registry miss) is
+		// the normal no-claims case for most namespaces — stay silent. Any
+		// other failure is a real problem worth a rate-limited WARN.
+		if !errors.Is(err, registry.ErrFunctionNotFound) {
+			p.warnRateLimited("claims provider invoke failed (minting without custom claims)",
+				namespace, err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	if resp.Status != serverless.InvocationStatusSuccess {
+		p.warnRateLimited("claims provider returned non-success (minting without custom claims)",
+			namespace, nil)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return sanitizeProviderClaims(resp.Output)
+}
+
+// sanitizeProviderClaims parses the provider's RAW stdout as a bare JSON object
+// of additive claims (NOT an {ok,result} Ack envelope — per the #976 contract)
+// and returns a safe string→string subset: string values only, reserved keys
+// dropped, bounded count and total size. Any parse failure → nil (fail-open).
+func sanitizeProviderClaims(raw []byte) map[string]string {
+	if len(raw) == 0 || len(raw) > maxCustomClaimsBytes {
+		return nil
+	}
+	var obj map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &obj); err != nil || len(obj) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	// Iterate in sorted key order so an over-budget provider payload truncates
+	// DETERMINISTICALLY (Go map iteration is randomized) — the same output must
+	// always yield the same claims, never a per-login-varying subset.
+	keys := make([]string, 0, len(obj))
+	for k := range obj {
+		keys = append(keys, k)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(keys)
+
+	out := make(map[string]string, len(obj))
+	total := 0
+	for _, k := range keys {
+		if len(out) >= maxCustomClaims {
+			break
+		}
+		if _, reserved := reservedClaimKeys[k]; reserved {
+			continue
+		}
+		s, ok := obj[k].(string) // string→string contract; non-string values dropped
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		total += len(k) + len(s)
+		if total > maxCustomClaimsBytes {
+			break
+		}
+		out[k] = s
+	}
+	if len(out) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func (p *jwtClaimsProvider) warnRateLimited(msg, namespace string, err error) {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	now := time.Now()
+	if now.Sub(p.lastWarnUTC) < claimsProviderWarnInterval {
+		p.mu.Unlock()
+		return
+	}
+	p.lastWarnUTC = now
+	p.mu.Unlock()
+
+	fields := []zap.Field{zap.String("namespace", namespace), zap.String("function", claimsProviderFnName)}
+	if err != nil {
+		fields = append(fields, zap.Error(err))
+	}
+	p.logger.Warn(msg, fields...)
+}
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/claims_provider_test.go b/core/pkg/gateway/claims_provider_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83c0047
--- /dev/null
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/claims_provider_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+package gateway
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Bugboard #548: the claims-provider sanitizer is the security boundary —
+// a namespace function must NOT be able to forge reserved claims, inject
+// non-string values, or blow the size budget.
+
+func TestSanitizeProviderClaims_happyPath(t *testing.T) {
+	out := sanitizeProviderClaims([]byte(`{"account_id":"u-123","tier":"pro"}`))
+	if out["account_id"] != "u-123" || out["tier"] != "pro" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected additive claims, got %v", out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSanitizeProviderClaims_dropsReservedKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	// A malicious provider tries to override sub/exp/namespace — must be dropped.
+	out := sanitizeProviderClaims([]byte(`{"sub":"0xATTACKER","exp":"9999999999","namespace":"evil","account_id":"u-1"}`))
+	for _, k := range []string{"sub", "exp", "namespace"} {
+		if _, present := out[k]; present {
+			t.Errorf("reserved key %q must be dropped, got %v", k, out)
+		}
+	}
+	if out["account_id"] != "u-1" {
+		t.Errorf("legitimate claim dropped: %v", out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSanitizeProviderClaims_nonStringValuesDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	out := sanitizeProviderClaims([]byte(`{"account_id":"u-1","num":5,"obj":{"a":1},"arr":[1],"ok":"yes"}`))
+	if len(out) != 2 || out["account_id"] != "u-1" || out["ok"] != "yes" {
+		t.Errorf("non-string values must be dropped; got %v", out)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSanitizeProviderClaims_failOpenOnGarbage(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, bad := range [][]byte{
+		nil,
+		[]byte(``),
+		[]byte(`not json`),
+		[]byte(`[1,2,3]`),         // array, not object
+		[]byte(`"just a string"`), // scalar
+		[]byte(`{}`),              // empty object
+		[]byte(`{"ok":true,"result":{"account_id":"u"}}`), // Ack envelope (wrong shape) → no top-level string claims
+	} {
+		if got := sanitizeProviderClaims(bad); got != nil {
+			t.Errorf("garbage %q must yield nil (fail-open), got %v", bad, got)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSanitizeProviderClaims_countAndSizeCapped(t *testing.T) {
+	// Way more than maxCustomClaims string entries.
+	buf := []byte("{")
+	for i := 0; i < maxCustomClaims+20; i++ {
+		if i > 0 {
+			buf = append(buf, ',')
+		}
+		buf = append(buf, []byte(`"k`)...)
+		buf = append(buf, []byte(itoa(i))...)
+		buf = append(buf, []byte(`":"v"`)...)
+	}
+	buf = append(buf, '}')
+	out := sanitizeProviderClaims(buf)
+	if len(out) > maxCustomClaims {
+		t.Errorf("claim count not capped: got %d, max %d", len(out), maxCustomClaims)
+	}
+
+	// Oversized total payload → rejected outright.
+	big := make([]byte, maxCustomClaimsBytes+10)
+	for i := range big {
+		big[i] = 'a'
+	}
+	if got := sanitizeProviderClaims(big); got != nil {
+		t.Errorf("oversized payload must be rejected, got %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveClaims_nilInvokerOrEmptyArgs(t *testing.T) {
+	p := newJWTClaimsProvider(nil, nil) // nil invoker disables the hook
+	if got := p.ResolveClaims(nil, "0xW", "ns"); got != nil {
+		t.Errorf("nil invoker must yield nil claims, got %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func itoa(n int) string {
+	if n == 0 {
+		return "0"
+	}
+	var b []byte
+	for n > 0 {
+		b = append([]byte{byte('0' + n%10)}, b...)
+		n /= 10
+	}
+	return string(b)
+}
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/dependencies.go b/core/pkg/gateway/dependencies.go
index c54cce0..715d94b 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/dependencies.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/dependencies.go
@@ -648,6 +648,14 @@ func initializeServerless(logger *logging.ColoredLogger, cfg *Config, deps *Depe
 		authService.SetRqliteClient(deps.ORMClient)
 	}
 
+	// Wire the namespace claims-provider hook (bugboard #548): at JWT mint time
+	// the auth service invokes the namespace's reserved `auth-claims-provider`
+	// function (if deployed) and merges its additive claims (e.g. account_id)
+	// into the token. Fail-open — a missing/slow provider never breaks auth.
+	if deps.ServerlessInvoker != nil {
+		authService.SetClaimsResolver(newJWTClaimsProvider(deps.ServerlessInvoker, logger.Logger))
+	}
+
 	// Load or create EdDSA key for new JWT tokens. Bug #215 fix: when
 	// cfg.ClusterSecret is set, the key is derived deterministically from
 	// it via HKDF, so every gateway in the cluster shares the same Ed25519
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/handlers/auth/handlers_test.go b/core/pkg/gateway/handlers/auth/handlers_test.go
index 56466d9..122b3e3 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/handlers/auth/handlers_test.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/handlers/auth/handlers_test.go
@@ -393,6 +393,32 @@ func TestRefreshHandler_NilAuthService(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// Bugboard #125: a non-bad-token failure (here ErrRotationNotConfigured from a
+// service with no rqlite client) must surface as a RETRYABLE 503 with a
+// Retry-After header — NOT a 401 that would force a locked device into an
+// impossible SIWE re-auth mid-call-ring.
+func TestRefreshHandler_TransientError_returns503Retryable(t *testing.T) {
+	svc, err := authsvc.NewService(testLogger(), nil, "", "default")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create auth service: %v", err)
+	}
+	h := NewHandlers(testLogger(), svc, nil, "default", noopInternalAuth)
+
+	body, _ := json.Marshal(RefreshRequest{RefreshToken: "some-valid-looking-token"})
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/auth/refresh", bytes.NewReader(body))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	h.RefreshHandler(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
+		t.Fatalf("transient refresh failure must be 503, got %d", rec.Code)
+	}
+	if rec.Header().Get("Retry-After") == "" {
+		t.Error("503 refresh response should carry a Retry-After header")
+	}
+}
+
 // --- APIKeyToJWTHandler tests ---------------------------------------------
 
 func TestAPIKeyToJWTHandler_MissingKey(t *testing.T) {
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/handlers/auth/jwt_handler.go b/core/pkg/gateway/handlers/auth/jwt_handler.go
index 23905e8..51575f8 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/handlers/auth/jwt_handler.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/handlers/auth/jwt_handler.go
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package auth
 
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) APIKeyToJWTHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	token, expUnix, err := h.authService.GenerateJWT(ns, key, 15*time.Minute)
+	token, expUnix, err := h.authService.GenerateJWT(ns, key, 15*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
 		return
@@ -103,11 +104,20 @@ func (h *Handlers) RefreshHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// the SDK persists it (bug #239 fix) and uses it on the next refresh.
 	token, newRefreshToken, subject, expUnix, err := h.authService.RefreshToken(r.Context(), req.RefreshToken, req.Namespace)
 	if err != nil {
-		// The service emits a WARN log on replay (ErrRefreshTokenReplay)
-		// so the operator can investigate. We surface a generic 401 here
-		// regardless — leaking "your token was already used" to the
-		// caller would help an attacker confirm a stolen token has been
-		// rotated.
+		// Bugboard #125: a TRANSIENT rotation failure (rqlite leader briefly
+		// unavailable during a rolling restart) must surface as a retryable
+		// 503 — NOT a 401 — so the client retries within the call-ring window
+		// instead of tearing the session down to a full SIWE re-auth, which is
+		// impossible on a locked device answering a VoIP-woken call.
+		if errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrRefreshTransient) || errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrRotationNotConfigured) {
+			w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "1")
+			writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "refresh temporarily unavailable, retry")
+			return
+		}
+		// Genuine bad/expired/replayed token. The service emits a WARN log on
+		// replay (ErrRefreshTokenReplay) so the operator can investigate. We
+		// surface a generic 401 regardless — leaking "your token was already
+		// used" would help an attacker confirm a stolen token was rotated.
 		writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid or expired refresh token")
 		return
 	}
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/jwt_test.go b/core/pkg/gateway/jwt_test.go
index c3afba0..8d4b725 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/jwt_test.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/jwt_test.go
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ func TestJWTGenerateAndParse(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to create service: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	tok, exp, err := svc.GenerateJWT("ns1", "subj", time.Minute)
+	tok, exp, err := svc.GenerateJWT("ns1", "subj", time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil || exp <= 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("gen err=%v exp=%d", err, exp)
 	}
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func TestJWTExpired(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Use sufficiently negative TTL to bypass allowed clock skew
-	tok, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("ns1", "subj", -2*time.Minute)
+	tok, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("ns1", "subj", -2*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("gen err=%v", err)
 	}
diff --git a/core/pkg/gateway/middleware_ws_jwt_test.go b/core/pkg/gateway/middleware_ws_jwt_test.go
index efee5ba..e31d87f 100644
--- a/core/pkg/gateway/middleware_ws_jwt_test.go
+++ b/core/pkg/gateway/middleware_ws_jwt_test.go
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func newAuthServiceForTest(t *testing.T) *auth.Service {
 
 func TestAuthMiddleware_WSJWTQuery_validToken(t *testing.T) {
 	svc := newAuthServiceForTest(t)
-	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("anchat-test", "0xWALLET_SUBJECT", 15*time.Minute)
+	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("anchat-test", "0xWALLET_SUBJECT", 15*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateJWT: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ func TestAuthMiddleware_WSJWTQuery_ignoredOnNonWSRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	// privacy issues of JWTs leaking via referrer headers, browser history,
 	// and access logs.
 	svc := newAuthServiceForTest(t)
-	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("ns", "sub", 15*time.Minute)
+	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("ns", "sub", 15*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateJWT: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -156,8 +156,8 @@ func TestAuthMiddleware_WSJWTQuery_headerWinsOverQuery(t *testing.T) {
 	// Header path runs FIRST and wins. Verifies the query fallback is a
 	// fallback, not an override.
 	svc := newAuthServiceForTest(t)
-	headerJWT, _, _ := svc.GenerateJWT("ns-header", "sub-header", 15*time.Minute)
-	queryJWT, _, _ := svc.GenerateJWT("ns-query", "sub-query", 15*time.Minute)
+	headerJWT, _, _ := svc.GenerateJWT("ns-header", "sub-header", 15*time.Minute, nil)
+	queryJWT, _, _ := svc.GenerateJWT("ns-query", "sub-query", 15*time.Minute, nil)
 
 	g := &Gateway{authService: svc}
 
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ func TestAuthMiddleware_WSJWTQuery_malformedJWTFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestValidateAuthForNamespaceProxy_WSJWTQuery(t *testing.T) {
 	svc := newAuthServiceForTest(t)
-	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("anchat-test", "0xWALLET", 15*time.Minute)
+	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("anchat-test", "0xWALLET", 15*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateJWT: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ func TestValidateAuthForNamespaceProxy_WSJWTQuery(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestValidateAuthForNamespaceProxy_WSJWTQuery_ignoredOnNonWS(t *testing.T) {
 	svc := newAuthServiceForTest(t)
-	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("anchat-test", "0xWALLET", 15*time.Minute)
+	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("anchat-test", "0xWALLET", 15*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateJWT: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ func TestValidateAuthForNamespaceProxy_WSJWTQuery_ignoredOnNonWS(t *testing.T) {
 // doesn't leak into proxy hops or downstream logs.
 func TestAuthMiddleware_WSJWTQuery_strippedAfterVerify(t *testing.T) {
 	svc := newAuthServiceForTest(t)
-	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("anchat-test", "0xWALLET", 15*time.Minute)
+	token, _, err := svc.GenerateJWT("anchat-test", "0xWALLET", 15*time.Minute, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GenerateJWT: %v", err)
 	}
diff --git a/core/pkg/serverless/invoke.go b/core/pkg/serverless/invoke.go
index d101d84..447e932 100644
--- a/core/pkg/serverless/invoke.go
+++ b/core/pkg/serverless/invoke.go
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ func (i *Invoker) BatchInvoke(ctx context.Context, req *BatchInvokeRequest) (*Ba
 func isSystemTrigger(t TriggerType) bool {
 	switch t {
 	case TriggerTypeCron, TriggerTypePubSub, TriggerTypeDatabase,
-		TriggerTypeTimer, TriggerTypeJob:
+		TriggerTypeTimer, TriggerTypeJob, TriggerTypeInternal:
 		return true
 	}
 	return false
diff --git a/core/pkg/serverless/types.go b/core/pkg/serverless/types.go
index f9d99a8..7157db1 100644
--- a/core/pkg/serverless/types.go
+++ b/core/pkg/serverless/types.go
@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ const (
 	TriggerTypePubSub    TriggerType = "pubsub"
 	TriggerTypeTimer     TriggerType = "timer"
 	TriggerTypeJob       TriggerType = "job"
+	// TriggerTypeInternal marks a gateway-initiated invocation with no end-user
+	// caller (e.g. the auth claims-provider hook at JWT mint time, bugboard
+	// #548). Treated as a system trigger so the per-caller authorization check
+	// is skipped — the gateway is the trusted invoker.
+	TriggerTypeInternal TriggerType = "internal"
 )
 
 // JobStatus represents the current state of a background job.
@@ -234,8 +239,8 @@ type FunctionDefinition struct {
 	// When WSPersistent is true, the function exports ws_open/ws_frame/ws_close
 	// instead of using the default per-frame stateless model.
 	WSPersistent         bool `json:"ws_persistent,omitempty"`
-	WSIdleTimeoutSec     int  `json:"ws_idle_timeout_sec,omitempty"`     // 0 = no idle timeout
-	WSMaxFrameBytes      int  `json:"ws_max_frame_bytes,omitempty"`      // 0 = use default 256 KB
+	WSIdleTimeoutSec     int  `json:"ws_idle_timeout_sec,omitempty"`      // 0 = no idle timeout
+	WSMaxFrameBytes      int  `json:"ws_max_frame_bytes,omitempty"`       // 0 = use default 256 KB
 	WSMaxInflightPerConn int  `json:"ws_max_inflight_per_conn,omitempty"` // 0 = use default 64
 
 	// RawHTTPResponse enables raw-HTTP-response mode (bugboard #835): the
@@ -284,11 +289,11 @@ type Function struct {
 
 // InvocationContext provides context for a function invocation.
 type InvocationContext struct {
-	RequestID    string            `json:"request_id"`
-	FunctionID   string            `json:"function_id"`
-	FunctionName string            `json:"function_name"`
-	Namespace    string            `json:"namespace"`
-	CallerWallet string            `json:"caller_wallet,omitempty"`
+	RequestID    string `json:"request_id"`
+	FunctionID   string `json:"function_id"`
+	FunctionName string `json:"function_name"`
+	Namespace    string `json:"namespace"`
+	CallerWallet string `json:"caller_wallet,omitempty"`
 	// CallerIP is the source IP of the request, populated by HTTP/WS handlers.
 	// Used by the multi-tier rate limiter as a fallback bucket for anonymous
 	// (no-wallet) callers.
diff --git a/sdk/package.json b/sdk/package.json
index b6b3cee..2717b0d 100644
--- a/sdk/package.json
+++ b/sdk/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@debros/orama",
-  "version": "0.122.47",
+  "version": "0.122.49",
   "description": "TypeScript SDK for Orama Network - Database, PubSub, Cache, Storage, Vault, and more",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",