The namespace-ownership middleware compared an api_key caller's RAW key
against namespace_ownership.owner_id, but api_keys are stored HMAC-hashed
(HashAPIKey). So every api_key-authenticated owner got a 403 on a namespace
they actually own — blocking function deploy and PUT /v1/push/config.
Hash the presented api_key before the ownership comparison (hashed first,
raw second as a rolling-upgrade legacy fallback), mirroring the existing
lookupAPIKeyNamespace pattern. The wallet path is unchanged (wallets stored
raw). Security-reviewed: grants only to the correct key holder, no
escalation.
- Add `ntfyFanoutResolver` to distribute push notifications across all active cluster nodes, ensuring delivery when nodes lack shared state.
- Refactor secrets encryption key derivation to use cluster-wide secrets via HKDF, replacing ephemeral per-node keys to fix cross-node decryption issues.
- Add unit tests for fan-out resolution logic and caching behavior.
A lost rotation response strands the client on a just-revoked token: the retry
hits res.Count==0 → genuine 401 → SIWE, which is impossible on a VoIP-woken
locked screen, so the call dies. This recurred under the reconnect storms from
today's gateway rolls.
Add an RFC 9700 §4.13.2 reuse grace: a refresh token revoked within 60s whose
grace_used_at is still NULL is accepted ONCE more and mints a fresh session.
The grace path skips the revoke CAS (the token is already revoked — the CAS
would 0-match and mis-fire the replay tripwire) and is locked instead by a
single-use CAS on grace_used_at, so a stolen token can't be replayed at
leisure. The window predicate is repeated on the CAS to close the
SELECT→UPDATE TOCTOU, and the grace SELECT excludes expired tokens.
Security (found + fixed in review): explicit revocation (RevokeToken /
/v1/auth/logout) now also stamps grace_used_at, so a deliberately-logged-out
token can never be grace-recovered — closes a logout-bypass where a just-
revoked token would otherwise be resurrectable for 60s. Transient rqlite
errors on the grace lookup/CAS surface as 503 (retryable), not 401, preserving
the #125 transient-vs-genuine distinction.
Migration 032 adds grace_used_at (additive ALTER, rolling-safe; NULL = grace
available, the window predicate keeps historically-revoked tokens ineligible).
Dual-reviewed: code-quality APPROVED; security SECURE after the logout-bypass
fix. Tests: lost-response recovery, single-use second-attempt 401, genuine bad
token 401, and the logout-bypass regression.
- implement `wsJWTExpired` to validate token lifetime with a grace period
- capture jwt expiry at connection upgrade and update via auth.refresh
- close connections with custom code 4401 when tokens expire to force re-auth
- add unit tests to verify expiry logic and state transitions
Custom JWT claims survive token refresh: migration 031 adds the
custom-claims column to refresh tokens, the new gateway ClaimsProvider
re-resolves claims on refresh, and the serverless invoke path carries
them through. Includes refresh-rotation, WS-JWT middleware, and
claims-provider test coverage.
- Add `turn_stealth_domain` to gateway config for stealth TURN support
- Introduce `turn_discovery` in `sni-router` to auto-discover per-namespace routes
- Add database migration to enable stealth TURN per namespace
- Document ephemeral state API in `SERVERLESS.md`
- add `secrets_encryption_key` to gateway config for serverless secrets
- implement durable TURN secret persistence to prevent config regen outages
- add regression test for gateway config loading and field mapping
v0.122.42 (f412425, secrets encryption) shipped the template emission,
the per-cluster secret generator, and the gateway.Config consumer — but
NOT the parse field on config.HTTPGatewayConfig. Phase 4 writes
`secrets_encryption_key` into node.yaml under the http_gateway section,
and pkg/config/yaml.go decodes with KnownFields(true) (strict). The
unknown field made every node.yaml parse fail, so orama-node exited 1
on every start and systemd crash-looped it (restart counter hit 380+ on
the first upgraded devnet node before the rolling controller halted).
Root cause: a generated-config field with no matching struct field under
strict unmarshal. Fix is the missing field. The runtime key itself is
still consumed from ~/.orama/secrets/secrets-encryption-key (pkg/node/
gateway.go), which already worked — so this one-field addition fully
restores boot AND the feature.
The standalone gateway (cmd/gateway/config.go) uses lenient parsing and
was unaffected.
Regression test in pkg/config/decode_test.go decodes a node.yaml
carrying secrets_encryption_key under strict mode.
- Add `raw_http_response` configuration to functions to allow verbatim HTTP responses
- Implement cluster-wide secrets encryption key generation and distribution for serverless functions
- Update documentation with UnifiedPush support for ntfy on Android/GrapheneOS
- split webrtc route gating into `webrtcServeTURNCredentials` and `webrtcServeSFURoutes` to allow non-SFU gateways to mint TURN credentials
- update `chooseRestoreWebRTC` to correctly resolve configurations for nodes without local SFU ports
- add unit tests to verify independent route registration logic (bugboard #25)
- Add internal WebRTC management endpoints to public path exemption list
- Implement DB fallback for WebRTC configuration during cluster restore
- Add unit tests to verify WebRTC config precedence and state self-healing
- Add `enable` and `disable` commands to manage function status
- Implement process re-exec in the upgrade orchestrator to ensure
Phase 4 config generation uses the newly-installed binary version
(fixes bugboard #15)
- wire PubSubDispatcher to host functions to support local wildcard
triggers for WASM-published topics
- implement batch deduplication by topic to prevent redundant trigger
invocations and bound fan-out
- propagate trigger depth through function invocations to maintain
recursion limits during local dispatch
- Update route registration logic to rely solely on SFUPort > 0, resolving a silent 404 issue where gateways with valid SFU configurations were incorrectly disabled.
- Retain WebRTCEnabled in config for backward compatibility with existing operator YAML and request schemas.
- Add unit tests to pin registration behavior and prevent future regressions.
- register "apns_voip" provider to handle PushKit/CallKit signals
- implement target provider filtering in dispatcher to prevent cross-talk
between alert and VoIP push paths
- add comprehensive tests to ensure backward compatibility for fan-out
and correct filtering behavior
#348 - APNs silent-drop guard
Apple's APNs silently returns HTTP 200 for pushes with no visible
content (no title, no body, no badge, no sound, no
content-available=1) and then drops them — which looked to the WASM
caller like a successful delivery. Now rejected up-front with the new
push.ErrEmptyContent sentinel, and the APNs provider returns the
structured push.PushError shape (HTTPStatus, Reason, Unregistered,
Wrapped) so the dispatcher can branch on Unregistered to remove dead
tokens automatically. Legacy ErrDeviceUnregistered sentinel is
preserved for errors.Is compatibility (wrapped inside PushError).
Always logs APNs HTTP response (status, reason, apns_id, token prefix)
so future silent-drop classes show up in operator logs.
content-available is also now correctly mapped from snake_case
Data["content_available"] (any truthy variant) into Apple's
canonical "content-available": 1 inside the aps dictionary.
#321 - mid-session JWT refresh on persistent WS
Long-lived persistent WS connections used to have to close+reconnect
when the JWT rolled — losing per-instance state, message queues, and
subscriptions. The handler now accepts an "auth.refresh" control
frame: client sends the new token, the gateway re-verifies it via
the new JWTVerifier interface, updates the per-instance invCtx
in-place (persistent.Instance.UpdateInvCtx), and acks. No close, no
state loss.
JWTVerifier is optional — handlers set it via SetJWTVerifier at
gateway init. When unwired the handler nack's with a "not supported
on this gateway" response and clients fall back to the old
close+reconnect path, so older deploys don't break.
Other:
- push/dispatcher.go: SendToUserDetailed returns per-device PushError
shape so callers can act on Unregistered / HTTPStatus / Reason.
- serverless/hostfunctions/push.go: WASM host functions for the new
detailed-error shape.
- serverless/persistent/instance.go: UpdateInvCtx mid-session.
Tests:
- ws_persistent_control_test.go: auth.refresh ack/nack paths.
- apns_test.go: empty-content rejection, PushError shape on 410 +
generic non-200, content-available mapping.
- dispatcher_detailed_test.go: SendToUserDetailed result shape.
- instance_update_invctx_test.go: invCtx update is per-instance, not
cross-tenant.
VERSION bumped to 0.122.27.
- Integrate PubSubDispatcher to enable libp2p subscription for trigger patterns
- Add BatchQuery to rqlite client to reduce round-trips for multi-query operations
- Implement lifecycle management for dispatcher and add safety limits for batch queries
Two serious bugs found via cross-node behavior observation:
1. libp2p peer-discovery published wrong port
PeerDiscovery's multiaddr was using the gateway's HTTP API port (e.g.
10004), not the actual libp2p TCP port. Remote gateways dialed that
port, hit the HTTP server, received 400, and failed the libp2p
multistream handshake ("message did not have trailing newline").
Result: cluster-wide cross-node libp2p mesh had 0 connected peers
and cross-node pubsub silently dropped 100% of messages.
The libp2p port is OS-assigned at startup (client.go uses
/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/0). It's not anywhere in cfg — it's only on
host.Addrs(). Fix: drop the listenPort field from PeerDiscovery
entirely and derive the port live from host.Addrs() via
extractLibp2pTCPPort. WG IP still comes from getWireGuardIP
(libp2p filters its own enumeration so WG IPs don't appear in
host.Addrs(), but the listener is bound 0.0.0.0 so the port is
reachable on the WG interface).
2. System triggers silently blocked by CanInvoke (#264)
Cron, pubsub, database, timer, and job triggers all fire from
gateway-internal state with no caller identity. Invoke() ran every
request through CanInvoke(callerWallet) which returned false for
the empty wallet — every fire returned ErrUnauthorized. Reported as
a cron firing every minute with "unauthorized" for 19+ hours.
Auth boundary for system triggers belongs at REGISTRATION time
(POST /v1/functions/{name}/triggers, deploy-time auto-register
from function.yaml). Skip the per-invocation check for system
trigger types; user-driven triggers (HTTP, WebSocket) still gate
on caller identity as before.
Tests:
- gateway/peer_discovery_test.go covers extractLibp2pTCPPort.
- serverless/invoke_system_trigger_test.go covers the bypass and the
user-trigger gate.
VERSION bumped to 0.122.25.
HostFunctions is a process-wide singleton (one per gateway engine).
Its `invCtx` field is shared across all WASM instances. For STATELESS
execution the executor sets/clears it per-call but the lock is
released before WASM runs — two concurrent invocations can race on
the field and one's host call can read the other's identity. Window
is microseconds.
For PERSISTENT WS the bug was much worse: invCtx used to be bound
ONCE at instantiation and reused for the connection's lifetime. Two
simultaneous persistent WS connections from different namespaces /
wallets overwrote each other's invCtx, and EVERY subsequent
function_invoke / GetCallerJWTSubject / GetCallerWallet / GetSecret
call from inside the WASM read whatever was bound LAST. Result:
silent identity leak across tenants for as long as the connections
overlapped.
Fix: per-call invCtx propagation through Go's context.Context.
wazero passes the ctx given to api.Function.Call through to host
function callbacks, so every WASM-host hop carries its own invCtx.
- pkg/serverless/invocation_context.go (new): WithInvocationContext +
InvocationContextFromCtx helpers using an unexported invCtxKey.
- pkg/serverless/hostfunctions/invocation_context.go (new):
currentInvocationContext(ctx) — ctx-attached invCtx wins over the
singleton field.
- All host accessors (FunctionInvoke, GetEnv, GetSecret, GetRequestID,
GetCallerWallet, GetWSClientID, GetCallerClaim, GetCallerJWTSubject)
now route through currentInvocationContext(ctx).
- pkg/serverless/persistent/instance.go: every export call's ctx is
wrapped with the per-instance invCtx before being passed to wazero.
- pkg/gateway/handlers/serverless/ws_persistent_handler.go: invCtx is
built per-frame and attached to ctx, not stored on a shared field.
- pkg/serverless/engine.go: removed the SetInvocationContext call at
InstantiatePersistent (no longer needed; ctx carries it).
Stateless still uses the singleton field — its race is latent since
the host-functions split and migrating it is a separate scoped
change.
Tests:
- hostfunctions/invocation_context_test.go covers ctx-wins-over-singleton.
- gateway/handlers/serverless/ws_persistent_handler_test.go covers the
per-frame ctx wiring.
- cli/functions/build_test.go is new coverage for the build path
touched in this change.
VERSION bumped to 0.122.24.
handleNamespaceGatewayRequest rewrites r.Host to the backend target
IP:port (e.g. "10.0.0.6:10004") before forwarding. The original
public host (e.g. "ns-anchat-test.orama-devnet.network") is preserved
in X-Forwarded-Host. checkWSOrigin in both pubsub/ws_client.go and
serverless/ws_handler.go was comparing the client's Origin against
the proxied r.Host only — so every browser / RN-iOS WS upgrade was
rejected 403 because their Origin's public hostname can never match
10.0.0.6.
curl probes don't send Origin, so curl returned true unconditionally
and the bug was invisible to operator smoke tests. AnChat's iPhone
WS clients hit `code=1006 reason="Received bad response code from
server: 403"` for ~24h.
Fix: prefer X-Forwarded-Host (the original public host) when present,
fall back to r.Host for direct (non-proxied) connections. Applied
identically to both WS handlers. Regression test in
serverless/ws_origin_test.go covers the proxy-hop case, no-Origin
case, and direct-connection case.
This is the real fix; v0.122.19 only closed a separate silent-forward
auth hole that produced opaque 401s on a different code path.
VERSION bumped to 0.122.20.
Root-cause hardening for bug #240 and #249's "intermittent 401 over WS"
reports. handleNamespaceGatewayRequest previously had a third code
path beyond "auth ok" and "auth error": when validateAuthForNamespaceProxy
returned empty namespace AND empty error (i.e. "no credentials found"),
the request fell through to a silent forward to the namespace gateway
WITHOUT internal-auth headers. The namespace gateway then rejected
with 401 "missing API key" in ~60µs.
From the client's perspective: opaque 401.
From our side: only the namespace gateway logged it, and that tier
can't validate API keys (they live in the main cluster RQLite), so
the operator had no signal that the main gateway had even seen the
request. AnChat's intermittent 401-on-WS reports went unsolved for
this exact reason.
Fix:
- Explicit reject at main when no credentials extracted AND path
isn't public. Returns 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm and a
clear message naming the three accepted credential sources.
- Rich structured logging on every WS upgrade auth outcome: presence
of api_key/token/jwt query params, Authorization + X-API-Key
headers, Connection/Upgrade headers, Origin, User-Agent, client IP,
raw query length. Steady-state stays low-noise: success path logs at
debug, reject paths log at warn.
- Namespace-mismatch reject (existing branch) now also logs.
VERSION bumped to 0.122.19.
Migration 028: namespace_push_credentials
- Per-(namespace, provider) AES-256-GCM encrypted credential blob.
- Generic schema — apns/ntfy/expo/future plug in with zero migration.
- Separated from migration 026's namespace_push_config (preferences vs
credentials, different access patterns).
pkg/push/credentials
- Manager + Registry + RQLite store; HKDF purpose "namespace-push-credentials"
via pkg/secrets. Provider Validator interface for per-provider schema.
pkg/push/providers/apns
- Apple Push Notification service direct provider (no Expo proxy).
- Validator + dispatcher; credentials are p8 signing key + key_id + team_id.
pkg/push/providers/ntfy/credentials.go
- ntfy credential schema (auth_token + default topic). Used both with
the public ntfy.sh and our self-hosted instance.
pkg/environments/production/installers/ntfy.go
- Self-hosted ntfy server installer. Binary, system user, hardened
/etc/ntfy/server.yml, systemd unit. Listens on 127.0.0.1:NtfyListenPort
only — Caddy is the only public path.
pkg/environments/production/installers/caddy.go
- Emit reverse_proxy block for push.<dnsZone> -> 127.0.0.1:NtfyListenPort
when operator enables ntfy on a node.
CLI: install/upgrade orchestrators learn a new "ntfy" install/preserve
phase; flag gating in install/flags.go + upgrade/flags.go.
Gateway handlers/push/credentials_handler.go
- GET/PUT/DELETE /v1/namespace/push-credentials/{provider}.
- PUT validates against provider Validator before encrypting and storing.
- GET returns a redacted view (booleans + non-secret fields only).
Push manager: provider resolution now also consults
namespace_push_credentials before falling back to YAML defaults.
Docs: core/docs/PUSH_NOTIFICATIONS.md walks through end-to-end setup.
VERSION bumped to 0.122.14.
Per-namespace rate-limit config (feature #69)
- Migration 027: new `namespace_rate_limit_config` table
(namespace PK, requests_per_minute, burst, audit metadata).
- pkg/ratelimit: Manager + RQLite ConfigStore + types. Same pattern
as the push config in bug #220's follow-up — LRU cache, invalidate
on PUT/DELETE, falls back to YAML defaults when no row exists.
- pkg/gateway/handlers/ratelimit: GET/PUT/DELETE /v1/namespace/rate-limit.
PUT requests are rejected if they exceed the operator's configured
ceiling (MaxRequestsPerMinute / MaxBurst) — tenants self-serve but
cannot raise their quota past the cap.
- pkg/gateway/rate_limiter.go: per-namespace lookup, default fallback.
- pkg/gateway/middleware.go: WS JWT middleware (middleware_ws_jwt_test.go).
- pkg/gateway/auth/service.go: refresh-token rotation hardening with
regression test in refresh_rotation_test.go.
AI agent instructions
- Add AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .github/copilot-instructions.md (DeBros v0.2.0
baseline).
DeBros rules bumped to v0.2.0 (sha bb6e6ef).
VERSION bumped to 0.122.12.
- Change RQLite consistency level from `none` to `weak` to ensure reads
route to the leader and prevent stale data reads (fixes#235)
- Add `normalizeColumnKey` to allow snake_case SQL columns to map to
CamelCase Go struct fields automatically (fixes#65)
- Add comprehensive unit tests for DSN generation and column mapping
- Add `namespace_push_config` table for per-namespace provider settings
- Introduce `cluster_secret_path` to enable deterministic JWT signing and
AES-256-GCM encryption for push credentials
- Update gateway config to support per-namespace overrides of push
notification providers (ntfy/Expo)
- Bump version to 0.122.3
- bump version to 0.122.2
- document schema migration invariants and push notification configuration
- add serverless host function aliases and v2 database API documentation
- introduce schema roundtrip test to prevent migration drift
- Add `contract.go` to manage and validate embedded SQL migrations
- Introduce `AssertSchema` to verify database version at startup
- Include `SchemaMismatchError` with actionable recovery instructions
- Add comprehensive unit tests for version parsing and validation
- Add migrations for per-namespace publish sequences and persistent WebSocket function settings
- Integrate PersistentWSManager and WSBridge into the gateway dependency graph
- Upgrade serverless engine to use a multi-tier rate limiter
- Update JWT claims to support custom application-defined fields
- Replace CLI-based rootwallet calls with agent-based communication
- Update production provisioner to support sudo-based service management
- Add API key-to-wallet resolution for gateway operator handlers
- implement `nodes`, `rollout`, `ssh`, and `status` commands
- add `migrate-conf` utility to register existing nodes with the gateway
- update database schema to support operator wallet tracking for nodes
