anonpenguin23 123ca90b65 fix(serverless): get_secret round-trip via secrets.Encrypt + string scan (#837)
The base64 wrapper wasn't enough: DBSecretsManager scanned encrypted_value
into []byte, so the rqlite client applied base64 binary semantics on read and
the ciphertext never round-tripped — get_secret stayed empty. Mirror the
proven push-credentials store exactly: encrypt to a 'enc:'-prefixed base64
string via pkg/secrets and scan the column into a STRING for Decrypt. Text
round-trips cleanly through rqlite regardless of the BLOB column.
2026-06-15 14:46:36 +03:00

159 lines
5.5 KiB
Go

package hostfunctions
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/DeBrosOfficial/network/pkg/rqlite"
"github.com/DeBrosOfficial/network/pkg/secrets"
"github.com/DeBrosOfficial/network/pkg/serverless"
"go.uber.org/zap"
)
// secretsKeyBytes is the required length of the AES-256 encryption key.
const secretsKeyBytes = 32
// DBSecretsManager implements SecretsManager using the database.
type DBSecretsManager struct {
db rqlite.Client
encryptionKey []byte // 32-byte AES-256 key
logger *zap.Logger
}
// Ensure DBSecretsManager implements SecretsManager.
var _ serverless.SecretsManager = (*DBSecretsManager)(nil)
// NewDBSecretsManager creates a secrets manager backed by the database.
//
// encryptionKeyHex must be a 32-byte AES-256 key, hex-encoded (64 chars).
//
// When encryptionKeyHex is empty the behaviour depends on allowEphemeral:
// - allowEphemeral=false (production): returns an error. A misconfigured
// node must fail loudly rather than silently generate a per-process
// ephemeral key. With an ephemeral key, secrets encrypted by one
// process cannot be decrypted by another (or after a restart), which
// makes get_secret return garbage/errors (bugboard #837).
// - allowEphemeral=true (tests/dev): generates a random per-process key
// and logs a warning. Secrets will not persist across restarts.
func NewDBSecretsManager(db rqlite.Client, encryptionKeyHex string, allowEphemeral bool, logger *zap.Logger) (*DBSecretsManager, error) {
var key []byte
if encryptionKeyHex != "" {
var err error
key, err = hex.DecodeString(encryptionKeyHex)
if err != nil || len(key) != secretsKeyBytes {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid secrets encryption key: must be %d bytes hex-encoded (%d hex chars)", secretsKeyBytes, secretsKeyBytes*2)
}
} else if allowEphemeral {
// Generate a random per-process key (dev/test only).
key = make([]byte, secretsKeyBytes)
if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate ephemeral secrets encryption key: %w", err)
}
logger.Warn("Generated random ephemeral secrets encryption key - secrets will NOT persist across restarts (dev/test only)")
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("secrets encryption key is required: set secrets_encryption_key (see %s/secrets/secrets-encryption-key); without it secrets cannot be decrypted across processes or restarts (bugboard #837)", "~/.orama")
}
return &DBSecretsManager{
db: db,
encryptionKey: key,
logger: logger,
}, nil
}
// Set stores an encrypted secret.
func (s *DBSecretsManager) Set(ctx context.Context, namespace, name, value string) error {
// Encrypt to a "enc:"-prefixed base64 STRING and store/read it as a string —
// the proven pattern used by the push-credentials store. bugboard #837: the
// previous code stored the raw AES-GCM bytes as a []byte param and read them
// back into []byte, but the rqlite client applies base64 binary semantics to
// []byte on both legs and the round-trip never reproduced the ciphertext, so
// decrypt() always failed and get_secret returned empty. A text string round-
// trips cleanly.
encrypted, err := secrets.Encrypt(value, s.encryptionKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt secret: %w", err)
}
// Upsert the secret
query := `
INSERT INTO function_secrets (id, namespace, name, encrypted_value, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
ON CONFLICT(namespace, name) DO UPDATE SET
encrypted_value = excluded.encrypted_value,
updated_at = excluded.updated_at
`
id := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", namespace, name)
now := time.Now()
if _, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, query, id, namespace, name, encrypted, now, now); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save secret: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// Get retrieves a decrypted secret.
func (s *DBSecretsManager) Get(ctx context.Context, namespace, name string) (string, error) {
query := `SELECT encrypted_value FROM function_secrets WHERE namespace = ? AND name = ?`
// Scan into a STRING (not []byte) so the rqlite client returns the stored
// text verbatim instead of applying base64 binary semantics (bugboard #837).
var rows []struct {
EncryptedValue string `db:"encrypted_value"`
}
if err := s.db.Query(ctx, &rows, query, namespace, name); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to query secret: %w", err)
}
if len(rows) == 0 {
return "", serverless.ErrSecretNotFound
}
decrypted, err := secrets.Decrypt(rows[0].EncryptedValue, s.encryptionKey)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt secret: %w", err)
}
return decrypted, nil
}
// List returns all secret names for a namespace.
func (s *DBSecretsManager) List(ctx context.Context, namespace string) ([]string, error) {
query := `SELECT name FROM function_secrets WHERE namespace = ? ORDER BY name`
var rows []struct {
Name string `db:"name"`
}
if err := s.db.Query(ctx, &rows, query, namespace); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list secrets: %w", err)
}
names := make([]string, len(rows))
for i, row := range rows {
names[i] = row.Name
}
return names, nil
}
// Delete removes a secret.
func (s *DBSecretsManager) Delete(ctx context.Context, namespace, name string) error {
query := `DELETE FROM function_secrets WHERE namespace = ? AND name = ?`
result, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, query, namespace, name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete secret: %w", err)
}
affected, _ := result.RowsAffected()
if affected == 0 {
return serverless.ErrSecretNotFound
}
return nil
}